Politics is ruthless and unforgiving and, therefore, also has an elephantine memory. The suddenly-diminished former chief minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, is now invoking solidarity with the INDIA bloc — the on-again, off-again alliance of a few Opposition parties who came together before the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. But many of her peers might want to remind her that it was she who blocked the ascent of Nitish Kumar as convenor of the group.
Since then, Kumar has crossed sides, Banerjee has been confronted with a dramatic defeat and the 22-year-old alliance between the Congress and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) has collapsed.
There is, in effect, no INDIA alliance.
And even if it existed in some manner on paper for the limited purposes of parliamentary floor co-ordination, the Congress’s decision to walk away from MK Stalin may trigger more divorces among the multiple, short-lived marriages of convenience.
Take a look at what is unfolding in Tamil Nadu more closely to see the inherent obstacle in the Opposition’s ability to respond as a united electoral front.
First, before the polls, the Congress declined the offer from rockstar debutant Vijay — whose newbie party, the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) stormed the assembly elections in the state, winning 108 seats — despite voluble voices from within that pushed for a shift in strategy.
But, as soon as the election results came, the Congress sensed a chance for itself to be part of the next government in Tamil Nadu and threw its five seats in the assembly behind Vijay. Its old ally, the DMK, has dubbed the Congress a backstabber. It has formally passed a resolution against the Congress, accusing it of falling back to its “old political character”. Stalin, the Congress was reminded, was the first to endorse Rahul Gandhi as a prime ministerial contender, when several other Opposition leaders (including Banerjee) were harbouring their own national ambitions.
The Congress may have moved too quickly, in panic and without a plan. The aim, its leaders say, was to deny a backdoor entry to the BJP or its proxies. Hence, speed was essential. It didn’t take along smaller parties such as the CPI, CPM and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), and although they did eventually come on board, it wasn’t without drama.
By abandoning the DMK, the Congress only released the party from conventional obligations, so much so that there was real talk of an alliance between the DMK and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), with the latter actually considering breaking away from the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Eventually, the DMK seems to have decided against the wisdom of such a move.
Yes, by constitutional norms, the Governor should have given Vijay the first stab at forming a government. A floor test in the assembly should have tested his majority. But, again, politics has an unforgiving memory. And recent history is replete with examples of how parties with the single-largest numbers have sometimes failed to form the government. The BJP supporters point to the elections of 2013 in Delhi, 2018 in Karnataka and 2019 in Maharashtra as examples.
As the BJP consolidates its hold over the east, with the big Bengal win, it will be expected to turn attention with laser focus on the southern states. The Opposition is now confined to just seven of India’s states, and most of them are in southern India. In the north, with the splinter in the Aam Aadmi Party, Punjab also looks vulnerable.
Apart from its Kerala win, the Congress may derive small and short-term consolation from the diminishing of regional satraps such as Banerjee and Stalin. Perhaps, the party now believes it has an unobstructed path to be the pivotal party of the Opposition. Certainly, had Banerjee won Bengal, she would have positioned herself as a prime ministerial contender for 2029.
However, such schadenfreude on the part of the Congress is short-sighted. For the Congress to have main character energy, it has to first win elections. Currently, it finds itself reduced from a pan-India presence to a party of the South — more regional, than national. And within those southern states it has to contend with other regional groups competing for the same voter base.
The Opposition has many deficiencies in comparison to the BJP — problems of leadership, ideological confusion, lack of organisational structure, and inability to adjust to 24×7 politics, among them. But, for very long, it has normalised this idea of competing at the state level and collaborating at the national level, leaving an absolutely unclear picture in the mind of the new-age voter.
In any case, if national contests are to be bipolar now, the BJP has the Congress exactly where it wants it. Data shows that the BJP strike rate in direct contests against the Congress is much better than when it is pitted against a strong regional force. In 2024, for instance, in the 286 straight contests between the BJP and the Congress, the BJP had a 62.9% strike rate (180 seats) and the Congress 29%.
Meanwhile, the inability of the Opposition to close electoral ranks against the BJP means that if you are on the right of India’s ideological spectrum you have just one option to choose from. But if you are opposed to the BJP, the fractures and contradictions of that camp are self-devouring.
It might be worth counting on one hand the number of times the INDIA bloc even met regularly after the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. A parliamentary co-ordination meeting is rather different from an electoral strategy. The BJP looks on, amused and enjoying the last laugh.
Barkha Dutt is an award-winning journalist and writer. The views expressed are personal
